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G. and R.: Implied Warranties in West Virginia

IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN WEST VIRGINIA
"A warranty is 'implied' where, from the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of the sale or from the nature of
the thing sold, the law assumes it to be just that the buyer should
be protected, in addition to the contract of sale, by a further implied contract or guaranty on the part of the vendor, and so raises
by implication a warranty on the seller's part."' These implied
warranties fall into two general classes, those of quality and those
of title. The implied warranties of quality are of comparatively
recent origin2 in the common law and have been the subject of
much uncertainty. A majority of the states8 have gone far toward
remedying this situation by adoption of the Uniform Sales Act.
West Virginia has not yet adopted the Act, thereby leaving our
law in a state of doubt. Since it is well-settled in the law that there
is an implied warranty of title in sales of chattels, 4 this note will
be confined to a considbration of the implied warranties of quality
as they seem to exist i this state.
Much of the misuladerstaning has been the result of the decision in the case of Lombert v. Armentrout., This was an action
by -A, as endorsee, on a promissory note given by B to S in payment for a horse; B d~fended on the ground of breach of implied
warranty of soundnesp; the court held that the rule of caveat
emptor here applied and that there was no implied warranty of
quality. The court laid down the rule that there is an implied
warranty of title in a sale of chattels, but not of, quality; there
must be a fraudulent representation. The court cites only three
cases as sustaining this view. The first of these, a Virginia case
decided in 1860,6 holds merely that there is no implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose in the sale of a specific chattel;
the second, a West Virginia case,7 supports the Lambert decision
only by way of dictum; and the third, a case also in this state,"
supports that holding only as to the implied warranty of title. The
1 Haines v. Neece, 116 Mo. App. 499, 92 S. W. 919 (1906).
2 WLLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924)

§

228.

3In 1936 the Uniform Sales Act had been adopted by thirty-three states and
Hawaii.
4 Eichholz v. Bannister, 17

0.

B. (x. s.) 708 (1864) ; Byrnside v. Burdett,

15 W. Va. 702 (1879); Gould v. Bourgeois, 51 N. J. L. 361, 18 AtI. 64
(1889); UNIroRm SALES ACT § 13.

565 W. Va. 375, 64 S. E. 260, 22 L. R. A. (.v. s.)556 (1909).
6 Mason v. Chappell, 15 Gratt. 572, 56 Va. Rep. 962 (1860).

Jarrett v. Goodnow, 39 W. Va. 602, 20 S. E. 575 (1894).
a Byrnside v. Burdett, 15 W. Va. 702 (1879).
7
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weakness of the case is further demonstrated by the fact that it
has never been cited by our court in any subsequent case involving
implied warranties.
Other West Virginia cases support views more in line with
those of the Uniform Sales Act, which divides the implied warranties of quality into three categories: (1) merchantability;9 (2)
fitness for a particular purpose;1O and (3) conformity to description or sample."
(1) Even before the Lambert case, our court had applied
the rule of implied warranty of merchantability in the case of Hood
v. Bloch.- There, S sold to B all the cheese in his cellar at a
definite price; B refused to accept on delivery; in an action for the
purchase price, B raised the defense of breach of warranty, and the
court sustained this contention, holding that in such a sale there
is an implied warranty of merchantability. In so holding, the
court follows the fifth rule' 3 of the famous English case of Jones
v. Just,4 which has been frequently cited by our court. "Merchantability means that the article sold shall be of the general kind
described and reasonably fit for the general purpose for which it
shall have been sold."' 5 This proposition is affirmed by West
Virginia cases'" subsequent to.the Lambert case, showing clearly the
tendency of our court away from the holding of that case and
toward a view in accord with the Sales Act."
(2) In Hood v. Bloch, in quoting rules three and four 8 of
Jones v. Just, by way of dicta, the court evidences its approval of
9 UNuoam SALEs ACT

§ 15 (2).

lo UNipoR SALEs ACT § 15 (1).
- UNomR SALES ACT § 14.
12 29 W. Va. 244, 11 S. E. 910 (1886).

13"Where a manufacturer undertakes to supply goods manufactured by
himself, or in which he deals, but which the vendee has not had the opportunity
of inspecting, it is an implied term in the contract that he shall supply a
merchantable article."I
4 L. R. 3 Q. B. 197 (1868).
15 Keenan v. Cherry, 47 R. I. 125, 131 Atl. 309 (1925).
18 Gorby v. Bridgeman, 83 W. Va. 727, 99 S. B. 88 (1919); Appalachian
Power Co. v. Tate, 90 W. Va. 428, 111 S. E. 150 (1922); Guyandotte Coal Co.
v. Virginian Elec. & Machine Works, 94 W. Va. 300, 11$ S. E. 512 (1923).
'17 UhFoRm SALES ACT § 15 (2): "Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods
shall be of merchantable quality."
's Rule 3. "Where a known, described, and defined chattel is ordered of a
manufacturer, although it is stated to be required by the purchaser for a particular purpose, still, if the known, described, and defined things be actually sup-
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the -implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Rule
three, which states that there is no implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose where there is a sale of a "known, described,
and defined" chattel, even though the particular purpose for
which it is intended to be used is disclosed to the seller, was followed in substance in the case of Erie City Iron Works v. Miller
Supply Co."' In that case there was a sale of a boiler which was
described by its trade name supplemented by specifications for
alteration, and was inspected by B before the alterations were
made. In holding that there was no implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, the court gave great weight to the argument that where goods are bought by description and that description is satisfied, there is no reliance by the buyer on the skill or
judgment of the seller, and that thus the underlying reason for
this implied warranty does not obtain. This reason also forms
the basis for the trade name exception to this warranty, as laid
down in the Sales Act, 0 that no implied warranty arises where the
buyer asks for a chattel by its trade name. AppalachianPower Co.
v. Tate 1 seems to apply the trade name exception, but other West
Virginia cases 22 which might have applied it reach a similar result
by finding that the chattel was specifically described, thus coming
under the third rule in Jones v. Just.
Rule four of Jones v. Just, which states that where a seller
knows the particular purpose to which an article is to be put, so
that the buyer relies upon the skill or judgment of the seller, there
is an implied warranty that it shall be reasonably fit for that purpose, has not been applied in West Virginia, other than in dicta,
because in each case in which the rule was discussed there was
present one of the following elements: (a) purchase by a trade
plied, there is no warranty that it shall answer the particular purpose intended
by the buyer."
Rule 4. "Where a manufacturer or dealer contracts to supply an article
which he manufactures or produces, or in which he deals, to be applied to a
particular purpose, so that the buyer necessarily trusts to the judgment or
skill of the manufacturer or dealer, there is an implied term or warranty that
it shall be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it is to be applied."
19 68 W. Va. 519, 70 S. E. 125 (1911).
20 UlqF0Rm SALEs ACT § 15 (4).
"In the case of a contract to sell or a
sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name, there is no
implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose."
2190 W. Va. 428, 111 S. E. 150 (1922).
22
Shaffner v. National Supply Co., 80 W. Va. 111, 92 S. E. 580 (1917);
Erie City Iron Works v. Miller Supply Co., 68 W. Va. 519, 70 S. B. 125 (1911).
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name; 2 3 (b) purchase by specific description; 4 (c) failure on part
of buyer to communicate the particular purpose to the seller ;2 or
(d) sale of food in a sealed container."'
In spite of the fact that there is no West Virginia case directly
supporting the existence of this warranty, it seems clear that if
facts permitting its application were presented to the court it
would be applied.
(3) West Virginia likewise follows the Sales Act in applying
the implied warranty of conformity to a description.2 7 The rule
was first enunciated in Wilson v. Wiggin28 and was later followed
by the leading case of Shaffner v. National Supply Co.' 9 This case
involved the purchase of oil well tubing; B described the desired
tubing as to quality and size, and S agreed to supply the same;
the tubing failed to correspond to the description, proved unsatisfactory, and B was finally forced to abandon the well in which it
was used. The court here, after discussing at length the warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose and the trade name exception,
held that there was an implied warranty that the tubing supplied
would conform to the description given. The willingness of the
court to apply this warranty, together with the two considered
above, leaves little doubt as to the tendency in West Virginia
toward a liberal view definitely opposed to that expressed in the
Lambert case.
The West Virginia cases dealing with the subject of implied
warranty have given rise to some exceptions to the application of
the three warranties above set forth, which exceptions fall into four
2

3Appalachian Power Co. v. Tate, 90 W. Va. 428, 111 S. E. 150 (1922).
Cases cited in note 22, supra.
2r Buffalo Collieries Co. v. Indian Run Coal Co., 73 W. Va. 665, 81 S. E.
24

1055 (1914).

20 Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117 W. Va. 680, 186 S.E. 610 (1936).
In this case B purchased a box of cocoa from S,a retailer; B became ill from
drinhing the cocoa due to the presence of a putrified mouse in the box; B sued
S for damages resulting from breach of warranty and was denied recovery.
See Comment (1937) 43 W. VA. L. Q. 84.
2 UN3OM SALEs AcT § 14. "'Where there is a contract to sell or a sale
of goods by description, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall correspond with the description and if the contract or sale be by sample, as well
as by description, it is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods corresponds
with the sample if the goods do not also correspond with the -description."
A similar holding on similar facts
28 73 W. Va. 560, 81 S. E. 842 (1914).
is Norman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mg. Co., 100 W. Va. 515, 131 S. E. 12

(1925).

29 80 W. Va. 111, 92 S.E. 580 (1917).
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groups. The first is the trade name exception which has been previously considered in this note.
The second exception should be limited to the facts of the
particular case in which it is laid down or to facts similar thereto.
It deals with the nonexistence of a warranty of capacity for procreation in the purchase of an animal for the purpose of breeding.
In this case, Griffin v. Runnion, 10 there was an action for breach
of the implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose of
foal-getting in the purchase of a stallion. The court held that no
such warranty existed because the continuance of virility is highly
conjectural, being subject to numerous contingencies of life and
nature beyond the control of buyer or seller. Cases deciding this
question in other states hold both with 1 and against 32 our decision.
The third exception involves situations in which the buyer
has inspected the chattel prior to33 the time at which the implied
warranty would ordinarily have arisen, that time usually being at
passage of title.3 4 Inasmuch as "the basis of implied warranty is
the justifiable reliance of the buyer upon the seller's judgment","
the underlying reason for this exception is that when the buyer
has inspected the chattel before the purchase he does not so rely,
at least as to defects which such inspection should reveal. The
tendency is to hold that opportunity on the part of the buyer to
inspect has the same effect as actual inspection. This is true even
in states following the Sales Act, 8 which provides that "If the
buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as
so 74 W. Va. 641, 82 S. E. 686 (1914).
3' McQuaid v. Ross, 85 Wis. 492, 55 N. W. 705, 39 Am. St. Rep. 864 (1893);
Frederickson v. Hackney, 159 Minn. 234, 198 N. W. 806 (1924) (under

Uniform Sales Act).

32 Green v. Ryan, 242 Ill.
App. 466 (1926) (under Uniform Sales Act);
Trousdale v. Burkhardt, 207 Iowa 1133, 224 N. W. 93 (1929) (under Uniform

Sales Act).

33 Inspection as it relates to precluding a warranty from arising deals generally with such inspection as is made by a buyer before title passes, whereas
inspection made after passage of title has to do with rescission for or action
on breach of warranty and acceptance under the contract. See Note (1937)
43 W. VA. L. Q. 134.
3I Implied warranties may arise before passage of title under a conditional
sales contract. Peuser v. Marsh, 218 N. Y. 505, 113 N. E. 494, Ann. Cas.
1918B 913 (1916).

See UNIFORM CoNnrTioNAL SALES ACT

§

2, in accord. The

same should be true before title has passed in the technical cash sale.
35 WIL-STON, SALES

§

234.

so Hennig v.Iron Ridge Canning Co., 186 Wis. 499, 202 N. W. 466 (1925)
Horn v. Elgin Warehouse Co., 96 Ore. 403, 190 Pac. 151 (1920) (no reference

to Uniform Sales Act).
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regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed." 37
This trend was followed in West Virginia in the case of Showalter
v. Cl anters.38 Here there was delivery of hay to B which did
not satisfy the terms of the contract; after partial inspection of
the hay and rejection, B made a counteroffer for its purchase; S
accepted. In an action for the purchase price, B pleaded breach
of implied warranty of merchantability. The court held that since
B had an opportunity to inspect the whole, no implied warranty
arose. Holdings to this effect are predicated upon the theory that
good faith on the part of the buyer requires that he inspect the
goods and discover all reasonably apparent defects, and thus not
unjustifiably rely on the seller. 9
Rule one 40 of Jones v. Just, cited by our court, indicates that
inspection prevents the existence of an implied warranty where
the defect is latent as well as patent, at least where seller is neither
manufacturer nor grower. The case of Watkins v. Angotti4' purports to follow rule two42 of Jones v. Just, which provides that in
a sale of a specific, described chattel there is no warranty as to
patent defects, but in effect it seems to follow rule one, since evidence introduced at the trial all tended to show that the defect was
latent. The sale was of a factory and machinery for the manufacture of ice cream and it seemed evident that the defects in the
machinery would not be apparent to B until operation. The section of the Sales Act last above quoted, to the effect that there is
no warranty as regards defects "which . . examination ought to
have revealed", implying that there is a warranty where the defect
is latent, is clearly contrary to the seeming holding in Watkins v.
Angotti.
A final possible exception to the rules of implied warranty
is found in the class of cases represented by Pennington v. Oran37 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15

(3).

38 77 W. Va. 720, 88 S. E. 1072 (1916).
39 See WILLISTON, SALES § 234.

40 "Where goods are in esse and may be inspected by the buyer, and there
is no fraud on the part of the seller, the maxim, caveat emptor, applies, even
though the defect which exists in them is latent, and not discoverable on examination, at least where the seller is neither the grower nor the manufacturer."
41 65 W. Va. 193, 63 S. E. 969 (1909). Cf. dictum in the Shaffner case,
80 W. Va. 111, at 124, 92 S. E. 580, which says there is an implied warranty
of conformity to a description where there has been no inspection or where
if there were inspection the nonconformity would not be thereby disclosed.
42"Where the sale is of a definite, existing chattel, specifically described,
the actual condition of which is capable of being ascertained by either party,
there is no implied warranty."
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berry Fuel Co.,4 previously considered. Rule one of Jones v. Just
distinguishes between sales by manufacturers or growers and those
by-mere dealers. The Pennington case follows this distinction, holding that no warranty existed in a sale by a retail dealer as to
quality of food in sealed containers. The distinction is based on
the principle that the manufacturer or grower is in better position
to know of and prevent defects, than the retailer who deals in
them.4 4 The Sales Act expressly abolishes this distinction as to the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose.
After a full consideration of our cases it appears that the
holding of Lambert v. Armentrout is no longer the law in West
Virginia and that the trend is toward the more desirable view
expressed in the Uniform Sales Act. There seems to be good
reason for believing that this trend will continue, particularly in
light of the decision in the case of Kemble v. Wiltison,4" which cites
the Act as persuasive authority, the court saying that the "Uniform Sales Act has been adopted by a considerable majority of
American states, in fact by all the great commercial states", thus
indicating the favorable attitude assumed by our court toward the
Act. Dean Pound heartily commends this practice of applying
legislative principles in common law decisions, especially as our
legislation improves in thoroughness and quality.40 It is hoped that
until West Virginia is fortunate enough to have the Uniform Sales
Act as a part of its own statutory law, the attitude on the part of
our supreme court to place weight on and receive guidance from
the provisions of the Act will continue.
A. F. G.
J. P. R.
43
44

117 W. Va. 680, 186 S. E. 610 (1936).
Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U. S. 108, 116, 3 S. Ct. 537, 28 L. Ed.

86 (1883).
45
40

92 W. Va. 32, 114 S. . 369 (1922).
Pound, Common Law and Legislation (1908) 21 HARV. L. REv. 383.
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